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Recent Developments

Sessoms v. State
Test for Admitting Other Crimes into Evidence in Criminal Proceedings Does Not
Apply to Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Committed by Witness who Testifies at Trial
By Kristin E. Blumer

I

n a four to three decision, the
Court ofAppeals ofMaryland
held that the test for admitting
evidence of other crimes into criminal
proceedings does not apply to crimes,
wrongs, or acts committed by anyone
other than the defendant. Sessoms v.
State, 357 Md. 274, 744 A.2d 9
(2000). The court found that the other
crimes evidence rule, a court-created
standard, is intended to protect a
defendant from being convicted based
on a reputation or propensity to
commit crimes. Although the rule
protects the defendant from undue
prejudice, the court held that it does
not exclude acts committed by other
people.
On December 24, 1996, Tracy
Dillon ("Tracy") was walking through
an alley when a man who was later
identified as James Sessoms
("Sessoms") attacked and raped her
twice at knife point. When her
attacker released her, Tracy ran
towards home. En route, she saw her
brother, Kelly Dillon ("Kelly"), and his
friend, Antonio Shields ("Shields',), on
a street comer. Kelly later testified
that when he saw his sister, she was
crying and dirty, with leaves in her hair
and blood on her hands. The three of
them found Sessoms on a street comer
and confronted him. Once Kelly
determined that Sessoms had
attacked Tracy, he and Shields then
beat Sessoms nearly unconscious.

When Officer Edward Marshall
("Officer Marshall") arrived at the
scene, he found Tracy, hysterical,
standing about fifteen feet from
Sessoms, who was lying unconscious
in the street. Kelly and Shields had
fled the scene. Tracy told Officer
Marshall that Sessoms had raped her
and that he had been assaulted by two
unknown men. A nurse at Mercy
Hospital found inj uries consistent with
non-consensual sex; however, no
semen was found. Tracy admitted to
the nurse that she knew who had
attacked Sessoms, but refused to
reveal their names.
Officer Francis Shipp ("Officer
Shipp") drove Tracy home from the
hospital early in the morning hours of
December 25, 1996. At that time,
Tracy identified Kelly as her brother
to the officer. Minutes later, Tyrone
Pitman ("Pitman") ran up to the police
car and told Officer Shipp that he had
just been robbed by "that man," and
referred to Kelly. Upon hearing this
statement, Tracy said, "1 ain't saying
it is my brother or isn't my brother."
Sessoms was tried in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City on a sevencount indictment alleging rape, assault,
assault with intent to rape, and sexual
offenses. Sessoms, 357 Md. at 276,
744 A.2d at 10. The State filed a
motion in limine to exclude the
testimony of Officer Shipp alleging
that Kelly had robbed Pitman. Id. at

279, 744 A.2d at 12. Defense
counsel argued that the testimony was
relevant when considered in light of
Tracy's inconsistent statements
concerning her brother's identity and
Sessoms' claimofarobbery. Id. at
279-80, 744 A.2d at 12. The trial
judge granted the State's motion,
holding that the "highly prejudicial"
evidence should be excluded. Id.
At trial, Sessoms testified on his
own behalf, stating that he did not
touch Tracy. Id. at 278, 744 A.2d
at 12. He said that while he was
walking down Baltimore Street to
purchase lottery tickets, he was
approached by two men, one of
whom accused him of robbing his
sister. Id. Sessoms denied the
robbery, and was beaten unconscious
by the two men. Id. Afterwards, he
noticed that money and two lottery
tickets, which had been in his
possession prior to the attack, were
missing from his pants pockets. Id.
The jury convicted Sessoms of
third-degree sexual offense and
acquitted him of the remaining
charges; the court imposed a ten-year
sentence. Id. at 281, 744 A.2d at
11. Sessoms appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland,
which affirmed his conviction in an
unreported opinion. Id. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted a
writ ofcertiorari to determine whether
the test for admitting other crimes
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evidence should apply to evidence
offered not against the defendant, but
against a witness to establish a
defense. Id. at 277,744 A.2d at II.
The court began its analysis by
noting that the rule prohibiting
introduction of evidence of other
crimes was established to protect
defendants from undue prejudice at
trial. Id. at 282,744 A.2d at 13 (citing
Boydv. United States, 142 U.S. 450
(1892)). The court cited three policy
reasons for the rule:
(1) the strong tendency to find
the accused guilty of the
charge merely because of his
or her history of committing
such acts; (2) the tendency to
condemn the accused not
because of guilt, but because
he or she escaped
punishment from previous
offenses; and (3) the injustice
of unfair surprise.
Id. at283, 744 A.2d at 14 (citing lA
John Henry Wigmore, Evidence §
58.2, at 1215). The court emphasized
that none of these policy
considerations applied to anyone
other than the defendant. Id. The
standard was adopted by Maryland
in State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630,
552 A.2d 896 (1989). Id. at 277,
744 A.2d at 11. Accordingly, the rule
was later codified as Maryland Rule
5-404(b), using language derived
from Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Id. at
285, 744 A.2d at 15.
The court observed that it had
been afforded many opportunities to
evaluate the other crimes evidence rule
and had consistently held that use of
the test in criminal proceedings was
limited to acts committed by the
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defendant. Id. at 283, 744 A.2d at
14. The court stated that an extension
of the rule to parties other than the
defendant would "broaden[] it
beyond the type of prej udice that this
rule was designed to prevent." Id. at
285, 744 A.2d at 15. This
interpretation of the rule was
supported by a majority of federal
court interpretations of Fed. R. Evid.
404(b). Id. at 287, 744 A.2d at 16.
The court of appeals adopted the
majority rule that "when evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts
committed by a third party is
proffered by the defendant, the risks
of prejudice against the defendant
normally are not present." Id. at 291,
744 A.2d at 18.
On appeal, the State argued that
since Maryland Rule 5-404(a)
distinguished the "use of character
evidence based on whether the
character at issue is of the accused,
the victim, or a witness," Rule 5404(b), which uses the general word
"person," indicated that the rule was
intended to apply to persons other
than the defendant. Id. at 286, 744
A.2d at 16. The court rejected this
argument, noting that in Wynn v.
State, 351 Md. 307,718 A.2d 588
(1998), the court interpreted Rule 5404(b) along with Maryland case law,
and held that Rule 5-404(b) only
excluded evidence of wrongs
committed by the defendant. !d. at
286-87, 744 A.2d at 16. The court
found thatto expand the scope of the
rule to persons "other than the
defendant would turn the purpose of
this rule on its head." Id. at287, 744
A.2d at 16. The court reasoned that
evidence of wrongs committed by a

witness does not impute to the
defendant a propensity to commit a
crime.ld.
The court determined that the
excluded evidence regarding Pitman's
alleged robbery by Kelly might have
been relevant to Sessoms' defense,
especially when considered in light of
Tracy's inconsistent statements. Id.
at 291,744 A.2d at 18-19. The
court stated that the evidence related
to Sessoms' defense that he was
robbed by Kelly, that Tracy had
concocted the rape to cover for her
brother, and that the suppression of
this evidence denied Sessoms an
opportunity to fully present the basis
of his defense. Id. at 292, 744 A.2d
at 19. The court of appeals held that
exclusion of this evidence on other
crimes evidence grounds was
erroneous. Id. The court further
stated that exclusion of this evidence
denied Sessoms an opportunity to
impeach Tracy's credibility by
introducing her inconsistent
statements, and to show that Tracy and
Kelly "had bias, prejudice, interest, or
other motive to testifY falsely." Id. at
294, 744 A.2d at 20.
The dissent, authored by Judge
Wilner, criticized the majority for
reaching out to decide an issue that
was not present in the case. Id. at
295, 744 A.2d at2I. Hefoundthat
Pitman's accusation that Kelly had
robbed him was properly excluded
because it was hearsay, and highly
prejudicial. Id. at 296, 744 A.2d at
21. He agreed with the majority that
the rule against admitting evidence of
other crimes should be limited to
evidence admitted against the
defendant in a criminal case, but
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stressed that such evidence should not
"be freely admissible in all other
circumstances." Id. at 301-02, 744
A.2d at 24.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland's conclusion that the bar
against admission ofevidence of other
crimes applies only to defendants is
troublesome from a practical
standpoint. The limitation of this rule
opens the door to allowing such
evidence to be introduced at trial
against witnesses in criminal
proceedings, thereby putting those
individuals on trial. Admission ofsuch
evidence presents a fact-finder with
evidence that is irrelevant to the issues
in the case. As noted by the dissent
in the instant case, other evidence was
properly admissible to impeach the
State's witnesses. Use of evidence
that someone other than a defendant
has committed crimes or bad acts
should be introduced in a criminal trial
only in very limited circumstances.
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